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Entrepreneurship and Economic Development 
John R. Harris 
Scholars concerned with problems of economic deve-
lopment have tended either to ignore the entrepreneur or to 
enshrine him as the prime mover of the economic universe, 
This dichotomy in approach is hardly surprising sinee 
conventional economic theory assumes — and in the absence 
of a central planning "board, requires — the presence of 
profit maximizing entrepreneurs, calculating profits with 
lightning speed and unerring précision. Indeed, the entre-
preneur in this schema is not easily identified with flesh 
and blood, but is rather a deus ex machina» This is. not to 
deprecate economic theory but merely to agree with Baumol 
that while the theory of the firm is useful for many purposes 
it leaves no room for treating entrepreneurship in other 
than a trivial way» 7 
On the other hand, many social scientists have had 
occasion to observe that in some underdeveloped économies 
there appears to be a lack of response to economic incentives* 
They have turned to psychological or sociological explanations 
for the emergence (or lack of emergence) of entrepreneurial 
groups.. /ß8j/f7 Hagen expresses the position quite well when 
he states that "In a traditional- society in which nothing 
has yet occurred to. change tr.aditional personalitjr and 
culture, an increase in the size of the market or in the 
flow of saving available is-not apt to have a great effect 
in inducing continuing change in technology, " CìL,7^J 
The purposes of this paper are two. First, to present 
a conceptual framework for analyzir.g relationships between 
social, politicai, and economic variables; entrepreneurship; 
and economic growth« And secondly, to present some empirical 
findings from Nigeria. 
Although many définitions of entrepreneurship have 
appeared in the literature, a c.ommon thread running throughout 
the various discussions is that the entrepreneur is a décision 
maker.^ It seems most useful to identify enterpreneurship 
with the function of making décisions with regard to levels 
of production and productive techniques (the "what"and "how" 
of elementary économies) rather than solely with individuals. 
As such, the function may be carried out by an individuai 
or by a group. It may involve producing novel goods, or 
finding new means of' producing familiar goods — this is 
innovational activity. It.will usually involve creating 
additional productive capacity prior'to undertaking pro-
duction — thus bearing considerable risk. It may involve 
expansing production along familiar lines — yet imitativo 
activity too requires decisión making. The actual decisions 
made in any economy will range from difficult to easy, from 
"once in a lifetime" to'routine. However nice it would be 
to distinguish between important and routine decisions, 
between innovation and imitation, it is. virtually impossible 
to draw a dividing line that is operationally satisfactory, 
because the decisions made in any economy form a continuum 2 and any división is at best arbitrary. 
The tasks that must be performed by entrepreneurial 
units if decisions are to be effective includes perceiving 
productive opportumities, gaining control over otlier factors 
of production, organizing productive facilities, and in 
sorne cases managing the continuing operation of the operation 
of the productive facilities.^ It may be desirable to 
separate the last task from the others but, again, it is 
in practice difficult to separate management from decisión 
making. 
The ralationship between entrepreneurship and economic 
development should at once be apparent. Other things being 
equal, an economy v/ith a larger supply of effective decisión 
makers. will make better use of its potential resources since 
they will be combined more efficiently and will be used 
for more productive purposes. (This is the principal 
argument of Hirschman. /~¿.7_7) It is aiso clear that for 
a given level of entrepreneurial resources an economy will 
achieve higher levels of output if it has greater endovnuents 
of resources and potential opportunities for growth are more 
favorable. 
One way to attack the problem analytically is to treat 
entrepreneurial resources as a factor of production. This 
has been suggested by Harbison ¿Z3_7 and has been worked 
out in some detail by Harris. ¿ ¿ ^ , ch. 2 J As between 
conventional factors, there are relationships. both of-
so.bstitutahii.ity and. complomea±arity between entrepreiiBurship 
and other factors. Pollowing from a standard production-
function approach, demand for entrepreneurial resources can 
be derived as a function of price and a supply function for 
the factor can be 'specified. Such a model leads one to 
consider factors affecting both the demand for and supply 
of entrepreneurship. Broadly speaking, economic factors 
determine the "demand" for entrepreneurship while social 
and psychological forces along with economic factors determine 
the supply. Some interesting propositions can be derived 
from the comparative static and comparative dymanic properties 
of such a model that are parallel to familiar propositions 
relating to accumulation of conventional factors such as 
capital or labour. H, ch zj. 
However such a model fails to come to grips with the 
difficult problems of imperfect markets and imcertainty. 
On the basis of casual empiricism, one is inclined to believe 
that the market for entrepreneurial services is particularly 
imperfect. Individuais who were "fustest with the mostest" 
appear to reap rewards in excess of what could be considered 
rent for superior skill alone. Luck plays at least some 4 
part. In our définition of entrepreneurship, the first 
function listed was the perception of opportunities; this 
is a necessary and important function only if information 
concerning opportunities is limited and imperfect. It is 
the fact that entrepreneurial décisions are necessarily 
taken under conditions of uncertainty that malíes the study 
of entrepreneurship interesting. 
With a production-funetion approach, one can identify 
equilibrium quantities and prices determined by the inter-
sections of demand and supply curves only if a single price 
prevails for ail units of the factor. If instead, one 
wishes to consider a heterogeneous group of projects, each 
with a différent rate of return, it is possible to determine 
neither how many of these projects, nor which ones will be 
exploited without specifying some mechanism for linking 
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particular entrepreneurial units with specific projects. 
Therefore it is desirable to formulate a model which expli-
citly takes into account the complications of non-homogenous 
projects, imperfect information, and risk.° 
Consider the objects of entrepreneurial décisions to 
be discrete projects which, if implémented, have the effect 
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of mereasing total output. They may require new investment 
or may consist solely of reorganizing existing productive 
structures. Each project can be completely described by its 
attributes which include expected payoff, variane e of 
expected payoff, length of payoff period,^necessary scale 
of opérations, technical complexity, etc.u Thus, each 
project can he considered to be a bundle of attributes 
denoted by a vector 
(l) X_j = X^ (X-J^ j ' ' ' I 
where X^ is the jth project and the xn- ' s are scale values 
for.each of the k attributes, representing a point in a 
k-dimensional attribute space. The x. scales ?/ill be 
itiife »irH wi¡1 1 ' constructed so that a^higher value^ be preferrea to a state 
associated with a lower value. Thus we assume that a higher 
^O/OÌ-Y 
expected payoff, a lower variance of expected^^risk)', less 
technological complexity, and smaller scale of operation 
will always be preferred to their opposites. 
Entrepreneurial funetions are performed by décision 
units which may be individuals, households, or organisations, 
each of which is assumed to be able to order ali attribute 
bundles according to the relations X°PX or X°PX\ (the 
first meaning X° is preferred to X1, the second meaning X° -1 9 is not preferred to X ). Pollowing conventional consumer 
o 1 ~| 2 
theory, transitivity is assumed; that is, tTYJT and X^PX" 
implies X°PX^. These two assumptions (or sjcioms) together 
imply a total ordering of the entire set of attribute bundles 
(projeets) by each décision unit, let us also assume a 
continuous, order preserving, monotone function, uk(X), such 
that uk(X°) > u k(X X) if and aaly if X° is order ed before, or 
on the same level as X"*" by the kth décision unit 
(X°PX1 or X°PZ1 and X1PX°). These assumptions imply the 
existence of a system of indifférence surfaces, which are 
assumed to be convex to the origin."^" 
In a world of imperfect information, no décision unit 
is able to ascertain the full universe of potential alterna-
tives. Instead of choosing between ali possible alternatives 
a décision unit usually is faced at any one moment with a 
single opportunity for which a décision to act or not act 
must be made. 
Let us assume that each décision unit détermines some 
criticai indifférence surface u . We then.define the set 
1 "1 'AÌJ A S. 'K (Ç XÀ_ ^ 
Ak such that if X ^ Ak, u (X^)>uJAis the 'criticai indifferen 
surface and A, is the: action set of the kth décision unit. 
The following simple, but not implausible, decision 
rule can be postulated 5 if the kth decision unit perceives 
a potential project Z^ , it will be acted iipon (exploited) 
if X ^ A y j if X^^A^. it will not be acted upon. Figure 1 
depicts the action set of the kth individual projected 
onto a two dimensional plane (all other attributes being 
of specified and unchanging value). For purposes of illus-
tration, x^ can be the expected profits and 3:^  an 
inverse function of the variance of the expected profits, 
hence a measure of risk. The action set, A^, is represented 
by the shaded half-space, containing all projects such that 
Hence, if either projects X- or X- (which have J 0 k k ^ associated levels of preference, u- and u". respectively, 
k 1 J eachJ>-u ) were to come to the attention of the kth decision 
unit, they would be exploited. If X (associated with 
k k u u were to be perceived as a potential opportunity, it 0 0 * " " * 
would not be exploited. 
The position of the depend on several factors 
including preferences, access to resources,' skills, a 
subjective notion of the nature of opportunities that are 
likely to arise in the future, and on projects already being 
exploited by the decision unit. That is, a decision unit 
will decide not to exploit a project because it finds the 
particular project unattractive per se, because it thinks 
something b e t t e r will be available in t h e future, or because 
its resources are already fully extended. Therefore a 
complication arises if X- and X. were observed simultaneously 
TJ ~ by decision unit k. It is clear that X- would be preferred J to X. in such a case, but X- also lies in the action set. 1 1 v Exploitation of X. will most likely alter the position of U? 
J c because organizational and resource constraints exist for 
most decision units. One way to handle the problem is to 
assume that decisions are made seriatim. X. is exploited, 
k ^ uq shifts and X^ is exploited depending on whether or not it 
lies within the new A^  » Perhaps a more satisfactory approach 
is to consider three mutually exclusive projects; XH,X., and — j a new project X^ which consists of simultaneous exploitation 
of X. and X. It has frequently been pointed out in the 1 3 • 
literature that a complex of projects may afford possibilitie 
of internalization of externalities and pooling of risks, 
hence the complex is different from the sum of its parts. 
The decision unit then chooses the one alternative that it 
ranks highest. 
Another possible line of inquiry would be to introduce 
explicitly a cost of searching for alternatives and explore 
the conditions under which a décision unit will pay to 
obtain additional information. However, this promising. 
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approach will not be pursued further in this paper. 
xi /S 
Figure 1: The Kth Décisions Unit's Action Set 
In this model, the exploitation of a project depends 
on the configuration of the u k ,s, the constellation of 
potential projects, and whether or not décision units perceive 
the potential projects. . So far the problem has been received 
from the standpoint of the individuai décision unit. Sine e 
economic growth is related directly to the number and kinds 
of projects exploited in a period of time, it will be useful 
to... examine the model from the standpoint of the economy as 
a whole. 
Suppose that the economy consists of n décision units 
and at a particular moment there exist m potential projects. 
What is the chance that any particular project will be 
exploited? We can write 
(2) N(X.) = E 0 
3 k=l k 6k = 0 i f Xj * A k 
9, = i if X. e A. k 3 k 
where.N(X.) is the number of décision units which would be J 
Willing to exploit the jth project if they became aware of 
its existence. A simple and not unreasonable assumption 
is that the probability that the jth project will be 
exploited will be a positive function of N(X.), the fio?/ 0 
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of information, and the intensity of search for projects 
by décision units. This can be written as 
(3) PCX ) = P./N(X ), I/, 0 < p. < 1, 3p./3N. > 0, 3p./ai >_ 0, j j J D D D D 
where p•(X.) is the probability of the jth project being J J 
exploited, and I is a variable representing both information 
and intensity of search by the décision units. 
Therefore, expected increase in national output can 
be ¥;ritten as 
m 
(4) E(AY) = E p,E(AY.), 
j=i 3 . 1 
where E stands for expected value E(ay_.) is the expected 
incrementai output if project j is actually exploited, and p.. 
is the probability of its being exploited. It's important 
to note that while the P^'s are normally dépendent on private 
profitability, the EÎAYj's reflect social profitability. 
(If public sector décision units explicity consider social 
profitability as their décision criterion, some modification 
of the model may be required.) It is apparent that the 
expected rate of economic growth will be greater, the larger 
are the number of projects, the' incrementai output associated 
with each, and the p.'s. In turn, the p-'s will be larger, 
the greater are the N-'s, the better the network of infor-
mation, and the more intensive the search by décision units 
for projects. 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between p and one 
attribute, x-^ , which might be. taken to be expected -profit 
With the population of décision units and their (not identica 
u^'s given, and for constant values of ail other attributes, 
P o is seen to be monotone increasing function of x-, . That 
is, ceterus paribus, the higher is the expected return, the 
greater is the probability that any project will be exploited 
Similar reasoning can be extended to other attributes. This 
follows from the assumption that there is unanimity among 
décision units in ranking the order of preference of each 
k / k attribute and that the u 's are not identical. ( If the u 1 s (J O 
were identical, N. would jump from 0 to n at u(X. ) = u .) ,1 ,i c J 
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An increase in the number of décision units, s shift 
towards the origin of some of the u^'s, an improvement in 
the information system, or an increase in the intensity of 
search will shift the funetion upwards, say from pQ to p1. 
So far it has "been implicitly assumed that ail décision 
units hold identical expactations of profitability, risk, 
complexity, etc. with regard to a particular project if 
they "become aware of it at ail. This, of course, begs the 
important question of how subjective views of the characteris-
tics of a project are formed. Psychologieal studies of 
cognition and perception indicate that différent indiviauals 
will hold widely divergent opinions about the objective 
characteristics of any object."^ However, it is beyond the 
scope of the present study to deal with this important matter. 
If the individuai estimâtes of an attribute of a project are 
randcmly distributed, the qualitative characteristics of this 
model are unaffected if the X.'s reflect the mean values of 
the attributes. Alternatively, the problem can be avoided 
by assuming that there is an "objective" value of each attri-
bute which is reflected in the vector X^, and systematic 
underestimation or overestimation of an attribute by a 
décision unit is reflected in the position of its u Q. Por 
instance, the u of a décision unit which is consistentl.y 
optimistic about expected returns will lie closer to the 
origin in the x^ ("objective" expected return) direction 
than it would in the absence of optimism. This kind of 
assumption is necessary to locate projects in the attribute 
space and define the N(X.)'s. d 
However, décision units will differ not only on their 
subjective appréciation of objective reality, but the latter 
will also differ among units. Any particular project will 
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be more profitable for decisión units witli greater organi-
zational skill or more favourable access to resources than 
for less favored decisión units. Risk is appreciably 
diminished for decisión units that are more diversifiea 
or that possess more accurate information about proc-esses 
and markets. To the extent that a decisión unit possesses 
general advantages, potential profitability will be enhanced 
or risk diminished for any project taat it considers. Such 
differences may be accomodated through shifting their u 1s 
closer to the origin; the relative positions of projects 
in.attribute space is unaffected. 
In this model, economic factors such as factor supplies5 
technology, effective demand, foreign trade possibilities, 
prices, and institutional arrangements, can be viewed primaril 
as determinants of the X.'s. Changes in anv of these variable 
will change the valúes of one or more attributes of any given 
project. Inventions will create 11 ew potential projects and/or 
shift the position of existing projects in attribute space. 
External economies will be reflected by exploitation.of one 
project shifting the position of other project vectors, or 
by the definition of a composite project which will have a 
vector different from the sum of the component project vectors 
Projects which are dissimilar to presently exploited 
opportunities will involve a high degree of risk, Ceteris 
paribus; henee, innovation can be considered as exploitation 
of high risk projects. It is then apparent that the act of 
innovation will reduce the risk component of similar projects 
although it may either increase or decrease expected profit. 
Thus, imitative entrepreneurship can be viewed as exploitation 
of less risky projects, and within this framework, it is 
obvious that there will be more imitators than innovators in 
any population of decisión units. 
Similarly, social and psychological variables will 
affect the position of the U-^'s. Changes in personality or 
societal valúes will become manifest through changing decisión 
unit preference structures; "favorable" changes will shift 
the u 1s toward the origin in the expected return, payoff 
period, and risk aimensions. Changes in factor prices, henee 
in attractiveness of alternative occupations, will also 
V 
shift the u^'s in these same dimensions. Education and 
occupational experience will shift the u^'s in the techno-
logical complexity and organizational scale dimensions. 
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The development of' an organized capital market (or 
other credit institutions) will have the effect of shifting 
the u^'s.toward the origin in the scale of operations c 
dimension; decision units-will be enabled to exploit 
projects of large scale from which they had been precluded. 
If prestige is an operational attribute of projects (e.g., 
industry more prestigious than trade or agriculture), changes 
in societal values will be reflected in shifts of the X^1s 
in this dimension. Increased intensity of search for entre-
preneurial opportunities arising from changed personality 
or social values, or an imprived information system will be 
reflected through a shift in the p•1s for any given set of 
k X•1s and u 1s. J c 
The qualitative characteristics of this model are 
quite similar to those of a model in which entrepreneurship 
is treated as a factor or production within a production 
function framework. For the most part, variables that 
affect the demand for entrepreneurship in the one affect 
the X-'s (opportunity set) in the other; variables deter-J 
mining the supply of entrepreneurship in the one determine 
the N(X.)'s in the other. However, the model developed 
here explicitly introduces risk, imperfect information, and 
a probabilistic approach to matching entrepreneurial units 
with specific projects. In addition, it deals with hetero-
geneity' of projects and entrepreneurial units in a more 
satisfactory manner. 
Models of this sort are useful to the extent that they 
provide a coherent framework within which entrepreneurship 
can be investigated. They avoid a single factor approach to 
economic development and'help one to identify separately 
variables affecting the supply of and demand for entrepre-
neurship (or alternatively, the set of opportunities and the 
responsiveness to such opportunities). 
This framework is capable of accomodating many different 
experiences. Papanek has reported a high rate of industrial 
growth in response to economic incentives in Pakistan where 
conditions for a vigorous entrepreneurial response seemed 
12 
relatively lacking. In Greece there has been a long 
tradition of vigorous entrepreneurship, yet, according to 
Alexander, industrial growth, .has been disappointing because 
of problems in the economic, s t r u c t u r e W e can also think 
of examples such as the United States and England in which 
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both the economic environment and entrepreneurial supply were conductive 
to rapid growth and of Burma where both factors seem prejudical to 
groTfth. 
In a somewhat sirnilar vein, Papanek has aptly pointed out that 
'''The development of industriel entrepreneurs results from the 
interaction of three forces — the strength of economic incen-
tives; the values, institutions and political situation in the 
society as a whole; and the motivations of the potential 
entrepreneurs. The more favourable for the develepment of 
industrial entrepreneurs one or two of these factors, the less 
favourable can be the other one «r two without affecting the 
• results'.'1^  
II. 
The problem at hand is to dérivé propositions from the modél 
that are capable of empirical test. 
,(/eacî? t-~v?be ta-ken. as a celfèi»^ 
One group of hypotheses/flow directly from particular project 
attributes and assumed preferences with respect to these attributes, and 
to déterminants of the information variable. (The term "industry" refers 
to groups of projects having rather similar attribute vaiuès.) They are: 
(1). The rate of expansion will be higher in industries yielding higher 
current prônas-. " -g The underlying assumption. being that 
.expectations adapt to realizations. 
(2). The rate of expansion will be higher in industries with less complex 
technology. 
(3). The rate of expansion will be higher in industries in which économies 
of scale are not great, hence requiring less complex organisation and 
capital. 
(4). The rate of expansion will be highest in industries in which tech-
nological communication between the country and the rest of the 
world is most easily facilitated. 
(5). Innovations will be relatively rare but successful innovations will 
be copied quite rapidly. This process will drive down profits on 
similar projects and the rate of adoption will be slowed. This 
: 
proposition rests on two assumptions. First9 démonstration reduces the 
subjective element of risk associated -with a similar project and, 
second, information about a project existing in the country or 
region is more readily available than is information about similar 
projects existing only outside the country or region. 
A second group of hypotheses are based on factors that should 
systematically shift critical indifference surfaces of some decision units 
either through: affecting expected values of profit, skills and resources, 
or attitudes towards some attributes. In particular, the. possession of 
certain skills and managerial abilities by a decision unit will make any 
project that it undertakes more profitable than if the same project were 
taken by another decision unit less well endowed. Also, convexity of 
critical indifference surfaces (more accurately, convex action sets) implies 
that projects characterized by large scale, high risk, or"technological 
complexity will be undertaken only if they have differentially high expected 
profits. Therefore, propositions relating to decision units1 critical 
indifference surfaces in the scale, risk, and complexity dimensions can bo 
converted into propositions relating to expected profits, (Expected 
profits and.realized profits are. assumed to be positively correlated 
through operatila of an adaptive expectation mechanism.) 
These hypotheses tnlso to be taken as ceteris paribus statements) are: 
(6). Entrepreneurial performance will vary among ethnic groups, since 
ethnicity is usually considered to reflect differences in social 
structure, sanctions, and child-rearing practices which in turn 
condition an individual's (or group's) attitudes towards risk and 
affect modes of interpersonal relationships within an organization. 
These factors will also affect social and occupational mobility which 
are also determinants of the critical indifference surfaces. 
(7). Entrepreneurs (or decision units) with high levels of formal education 
will be found to be earning high profits on the projects they have 
exploited. This follows from the assumption that education contributes 
to general organizational, managerial, and technical skills as well 
as to particular skills which affect the ability to undertake large 
and conrplex projects. Education and willingness to take risk may he 
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correlateci; superior access to information may also reduce subjective 
risk. 
(8). Entrepreneurs (or decision units) with greater experience will be 
found to earn high profits on projects they have exploited. The 
argument here is parallel with the previous one with regard to formal 
education. Experience should be considered both in terms of years 
and in the useable relevance of the particular experience for impart-
ing useable skills and knowledge. 
(9). Entrepreneurs (or decision units) that have innovated will earn 
differentially high profits. This is based on convexity of the action 
set. 
(10). Entrepreneurs (or decision units) with access to credit or other 
sources of capital in sizeable amounts will earn higher profits than 
those who lack such access. This is based on the notion that access to 
capital is an important determinant of the critical indifference curve 
in the scale of operation dimension which is in turn related to 
profit through convexity of the action set. 
(11). Entrepreneurs (or decision units) with good political connections 
will earn differentially high profits. This proposition is based on 
the fact that political connections are important for gaining access 
to resources, credit, and markets on favourable terms. 
We now want to confront these theoretical implications with facts 
from Nigeria. 
Ill 
The data used in this paper were collected through interviews with 
269 Nigerian firms during 1965. For several reasons the sawmilling, 
furniture, printing, rubber processing, and garment making industries were 
selected for intensive survey. Several other industries including beverages.-, 
lime making, bone crushing, pipeline welding, metal working, electrical 
equipment, transport equipment, gramaphone record pressing, brick making, 
sign making, perfume blending, and tanning, in which only a very few 
indigenous firms with more than 20 employees existed5 were also included in 
15 the survey. ~ Appendix I contains several tables which describe the 
characteristics of the respondent firas. Our best estimate is that 
this sample includes more than 30% of Nigérian-controlled firms with 
more than 20 employees in these selected industries and more than 30% 
' ' 1 6 of those firms with more than 10 and less than 20 employees. 
Mrs. Mary P. Rowe conducted ail of the interviews in the Lagos area 
while I did ail of the interviewing outside of Lagos. Each of the inter-
views was based on a préparée questionnaire using open-ended questions, 
and included questions about the history, activities, and current financia 
structure of each firm; management structure; sources of capital and 
technical information; future - lans; spécial obstacles which had been 
encountered; and a detailed biography of the founder or principal décision 
maker in each firm.~ 
IV 
Evidence from detailed studies of the sawmilling, furniture, rubber 
processing, printing, and garaient making industries is consistent with 
the first five hypotheses. JJ-ÏELLL ' 2F&_J Large numbers of 
Nigérians have been highly responsive to économie opportunities and 
incentives within the limits imposed by their particular technical, 
commercial, and managerial skills. Industries characterised by relatively 
high profits, simple technologies, and low investirent thresholds have been 
expanded rapidly - more rapidly, in fact, than would appear to be 
economically optimal since most are working at rather low levels of capaci 
utilization. On the other hand; there has been relatively little privete 
African participation in large-scale industrial activities which have been 
undertaken by expatriâtes and to an increasing extent by governments. 
The pattern of rapid adoption of successful innovations with attendant 
décliné in profits has been striking in Nigérian industries and is consis-
tent with hypothesis (5). Contacts with overseas firms have been importair 
in determining tha speed of expansion in rubber processing industries, 
while expansion of sawmilling ând printing tires accelerated sharpljr after 
the establishment of Nigérian branches by equipment suppliers. These 
branches offer excellent service and training in use of their equipment as 
well as information and technical advice. 
Propositions (6) - (li) each posit a systematic relationship between 
observed profitability of firms and observable characteristics of decision 
makers. (In the theory these characteristics are associated with decision 
units which may consist of several individuals while in the propositions 
these are characteristics attributable to individuals. Since the sample-
consists of firms dominated in almost all cases by a single individual thi 
presents no particular problem. If the sample had included many multi-
person decision units, definition and measurement of characteristics would 
have had to have been modified considerably.) 
First, it might be useful to specify the form of the posited relation-
ships more precisely. Each of the propositions should be interpreted as 
a ceteris paribus statement. A particularly simple form of the relation-
ships arises if one assumes that the characteristics are independent of 
each other and that they affect the dependent variable, profitability, 
in an additive manner. This can be written symbolically as: 
(5) Pr = C + a1 Ind + a2 Eth + a3Ed + a^Exp + ac Incv + ag Res + a? Pol + 
where Pr is profitability, C is a constant, Ind is specific industry or 
regional effects, Eth is ethnic group membership, Ed is education, Exp is 
relevant experience, Inov is innovational activity. Res is access to 
resources, Pol is political involvement, and u is a random error term. 
This is, of course, an extremely simole spécification of the hypothesised 
relationships, but it does provide a useful and convenient starting point 
The next problem is to devise operational definitions of each of the 
variables and to specify how they are to be measured. 
Unfortunately, although the theory suggests some general qualitative 
relationships, there is little a priori basis for choosing;» the precise 
ways in which the variables should be measured. Therefore, one is forced 
to experiment with alternative measures to determine how sensitive the 
analysis is to choice of measure. Of course f such a procedure contaminate 
the results , and reduces the extent to which one can claim to have tested 
the hypotheses. 
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The .appropriate measure of profits in this model is of economic. 
profit — earnings in excess of opportunity cost of all employed and 
owned factors. Thus it is an amount of profit rather than a rate, and 
can be viewed as a return to entrepreneurship or organization. However, 
it was impossible to obtain satisfactory data on profit from all of the 
firms in the sample, 
• However, our survey showed quite conclusively that retained earnings 
was by far the most important source of capital for expansión; thus it is 
likely that in Nigeria, the growth of firms and profits are closely 
related. Therefore, in the regressions I have experimentad with various 
measures for the dependent variable. First, present size of firm, measured 
by employment or valué of assets in both natural and iogarithmic forros, 
•have been ut>éd. This specification gives one measure of growth of the 
firm which is then regressed on a set of independent variables. Secondly, 
a direct measure of an average corapound rate of growth of employment has 
been used as a dependent variable (a similar measure of growth of assets 
was used which gave similar results but is not reported here), Finally, 
we constructed a rather arbitrary and subjective measure of "success" of 
firms which attempted to take direct account of profitability as well as 
growth of the firm. None of the measures are ideal, but there is reason 
to believe that they provide at least a partial measure of the !true;! depende 
dependent variable, profit. 
The data consist of observations of particular establishment5 but at 
least some of the variables such as education and experience should affect 
the profits of any undertaking by a particular decisión unit. It may well 
be the case that a very successfal entrepreneur maxim'izes his total 
entrepreneurial profit by diversifving his activities among several establis?" -
ments. And it may also be that he uses profits from one enterprise to 
finance rapid expansión of some other enterpris-. Therefore, the growth 
of any particular establishment controlled by him may be a poor indicator 
of the profitability of that establishment and of his total entrepreneurial 
profit. It has also been argued by Kilby and Schatz Ñjff that 
dispersal of activity over several businesses has been carried to an 
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irrational extent by many Nigérian entrepreneurs. Both considérations 
lead one to expect that the m'easures of growth should be related positivelv 
with the proportion of the entrepreneur's assets devoted to the establishme 
included in the sample; therefore this has been included as an independenr 
variable in the régressions. 
The first five hypotheses ail suggest that there may be systematic 
différences in profitability between indus! ies. Therefore it seems 
appropriate to include dummy variables (equal to 1 if the observation is 
from the industry, otherwise£"o capture specific industry effects, The 
rubber processing industry in Nigeria is exceptional in 
having the largest of the Nigerian-owned firms, 
The dummy variable for this industry is included in ail of the régressions 
none of the other industry dummies was significant. 
Ethnicity is taken into account by includir.g dummy variables for each 
of the major ethnie groups. However, only the variable representing the 
Ibo group proved to be significanti therefore ail others have been dropped 
from the régressions. 
The éducation variable is more straightforward. We have information 
concerning the *vj- ber of years of formai éducation computed by each 
respondent. At various times we used the years of éducation in natural and 
logarithmic foras, a four levai classification, and a dummy variable equal 
to one if the entrepreneur completed six or more years of éducation and 
zero otherwise. 
Expérience is dealt with by a number of variables. First, the age 
at which an entrepreneur founded his business provides a measure of the 
number of years of prior experience. Secondly, dummy variables were 
included to reflect previous experience in trading or clerical work. 
(Dummy variables for craft experience or farming were not significant and 
were dropped.) 
Innovation is handled rather easily by a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the firm represented some form of innovation and zero otherwise. 
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Approximately 20 per cent of the firms vere classified as innovational 
where innovation refers to establishing a new process, product, marketing 
method, or business practice in the région. 
Access to resources is represented by dummy variables eauai to one 
if more than 25 per cent of initial or expansion capital was raised 
through loans. Size of the firm at time of founding provides another 
measure of rescurce availability. The final variable, politicai activity 
is included as a dummy variable taking its value according to whether 
or not the entrepreneur has been actively involved in party pâlitics. 
Tables One ani Tvro present the results of several alternative forms 
of the régression analysis. Some relationships appear to vary systematically 
between Lagos and the rest of Nigeria. Therefore separate régressions were 
run and are reported here. The degree of expia-nation provided by the 
régressions is greater for each group taken separately than it is for the 
combined sample. 
Table 1 
Dépendent 
Variable 
Indep. 
Variable 
Begresaion-.Coefficients - Non-Lagos Respondents Only 
(1) 
PEMP 
. (2) 
LPEP 
(3) 
PAST 
(4.) 
L P A S ' 
(5). 
CGE 
(6) 
EVAL 
C , -26.3873 2.4115d -61-. 667 5 .7782b ..0313 3.2213" 
IEMP 1.2266° •0179d .1575 .0113° .0000 -.0036^ RUBB 41.6476^ .6123 59.6017 ..0113 .0424, 
.0133*7 
.7428° 
AITB 2.7965 
18.9913e 
.0291a 2.7182C -.0018 ,050.2a 
IBO .3866 6.7349_ ,2286a .0847 . 397'8 
OEDD -19.5933 .0381 -12.0381a .0299 - .0176 .1909 
AGE .3617 .0045 1.0433C .0201C - .0003 .0035 
SCLR 9.9740 .0518 10.0794 .4379 .0022 .0942 
STRD 
INOV 
21.2099*7 
23.5940 
.0351 
.4481 
14.9882"? 
35.7540_ 
.3934^ 
.6861 
.0246 
.0282n 
.3387° 
.3999^ 
ILN 1.1026 -.1690a 8.7053^ .0195 - .0352a .1566 
EXLN 50.7555 .6605 31.5162 ,7651d .0983 .9107 
POL • 12.7545 -.0903 15.4667D .2448 - ,0449e1 -.0236 
N o 101 . 101 101 101 101 94 R2 .5723 .5163 .5209 .4699 .2815 .2777 
F 9.8150- 7.8303 7.9749 6.5021 2 .8738 2.5960 
d.f. 12,88 12,88 12,88 12,88 1 -J-2; 88 12,81 
Sig p<.01 pc.01 p<.01 p<.01 P <.05 p< .05 
t>1.0 
3t>l. 3 
"t>l.6 
~t>2.0 
Notes to Table 1: 
Définitions of Variables 
Dépendent Variables: 
PEMP = Current number of paid employees 
LPEF = Naturai log of PEMP 
PAST = Present Value of Fixed Assets in Thousands of Pounds 
. LPAS = Naturai log of PAST 
CGE = Annually compounded 'rate of growth of employmeht in the firn; 
since founding 
EVAL = An index of subjective évaluation of the success of the firm 
based on growth and profitabilité/ (scale ranges from 1 
for unsuccessful to 5 for very successful) 
Independent Variables : 
IEMP = Initial number of paid employees (at time of founding) 
RUBB = Dummy variable = 1 'if firm is in'rubber processing 
AITB = Percent of entrepreneur^ total assets invested in this firm 
(measured in intervais of 10%) 
IBO = Dummy variable = 1 if entrepreneur's native language is Ibo 
OEDD = Dummy variable = 1 if entrepreneur has had six or more years 
of formai schooling 
AGE = Age at which entrepreneur founded this firm (measured in five 
year intervais) 
SCLR = Dummy variable = 1 if entrepreneur^ previous occupation was 
trading 
INOV = Dummy variable = 1 if innovations have been initiated within 
this firm 
ILN = Dummy variable - i if entrepreneur received 25% or more of 
initial capital through loans 
EXLN = Dummy variable = 1 if entrepreneur received 25% or more of 
expansion capital through loans 
POL = Dummy variable = 1 if entrepreneur has been active in politic 
Note: the F test reported for each régression represents a test of 
significance of the entire régression against the null hypotnesis that the 
value of the dépendent variable is equal to its mean. 
Table 2 
Regression Coefficients - Lagos Respcndents Only 
Dependent 
Variable 
• (7) 
PEMP 
(8) 
•LPEP 
(9) 
PAST 
(10) 
LPAS 
(11) 
CGE 
(12) 
EVAL 
Indep. 
Variable 
C 54.2856° 3.2749d 49.8406a 2.1447d .2514d 4.8240° 
IEMP .3296 .0101° 1.3693° .0165° -.0059d -.00983 
RUBB 
AITB -1.1583 -.0069 -1.07643 .0436b .0030 -.0063 
IBO 4.4605 .1217 -2.4655 .0878 .1640d .1915 
OEDD . ?.9872 -.1413 TC406 .3009° ,0069 -.0556 
AGE -.9438° -.0152d -1.1935d -.0234 -.0012 -.0175° 
SCLR 22.7442° .1538 1.3124 .1158 -.0242 .0414 
STRD -14.13.3$. -.3647° -17.1518° -.2568 -.0209 -.2957a 
INOV 17.7283 .5421d 11.7844a .890Sd .0934° .6107d 
ILN 10.1562 .1212 -1.5650 .2680a -.0033 .2301S 
EXLN 7.0136 .4782° 9.3941b d .6516 .0232 .6070d 
POL 45.9320d ,5253d 33.7134d .7823d .0295 . 35SS 
N 166 166 164 164 166 160 
R2 .1295 .2496 .3128 .3134 .1926 .209U 
F 2.0833 4.6570 6.2925 6.4357 3.3408 3.5650 
d.f. 11,154 11,154 11,152 11,152 11.154 11,148 
Sig p<.10 pc.Ol pc.Ol pc.Ol pc. 05 pc.Ol 
at>1.0; t>l.o; c d t>1.6; t>2 .0 
Notes to Table 2: Same as for Table 1. 
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Tables I and 2 present the results of two sets of régressions -
one for the non-Lagos firms and one for the Lagos firms (Lagos is the 
capital and largest city in Nigeria) - using six différent dependent 
variables and a common set of indepenent variables for each set of 
observations. 
As expected, the coefficients of the dummy variable representing the 
rubber industry (including crepe processing and tyre retreading) were 
large and, in most cases, highly significant (there were no rubber process-
ing firms in Lagos). The rubber processing firms started on a large scale 
and have been highly profitabls but have grown less rapidly than some 
others because of limitations on raw materials inputs, hence the coefficien 
is somewhat smaller and not significantly différent from zéro when rate of 
growth (CGE) is the dependent variable. 
Initial employment is a significant déterminant of the present size 
of firm, measured either in terms of employment or assets, although the 
absolute size of the coefficients is fairly small. It is interesting to 
note, however, that initial size is not significantly related to either 
rate of growth or the index of success (EVAL) which reflects both growth 
and profitability. 
Firms which nad been innovational were larger, had grown faster, and 
were more profitable than others, in conformity with prédiction. . In all 
cases, the coefficients were positive, relatively large, and in almost 
all cases statistically significant. However, one cannot jump directly to 
the conclusion that returns to innovation are high since we have data only 
on innovators who were successful. The incidence of innovational failure r. 
cannot be estimated from the data at hand. 
One of the crucial tests of the theory outlined earlier involves the 
importance of psychological or sociological variables as reflectad in 
ethnicity. In earlier régressions, groups of dummy variables for the 
five ethnie groups for which T had data (see table 1.6 for numbers of 
Yoruba, Ibo, Edo, Ibibio, and Hausa - the dummy for Yoruba was omitted in 
each case) were included. There was a serious problem of multicollinearity 
between Edo and Rubber Processing, and the coefficients of variables other 
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than Ibo were never significant. Eence, in this group of régressions I 
adopted a différent spécification, including only the dummy variable for 
Ibo. In the non-Lagos régressions its coefficient was positive, fair-ly 
large, and statistically significant in almost all cases, suggesting that 
Ibo entrepreneurs were more successful than others. This is exactly what 
1 7 the existing psychological and ethnological data would predict." 
However, there is an identification problem. All but two of the forty 
Ibo entrepreneurs in this group had their businesses in the Eastern Région. 
Hence we cannot differentiate between the hypotheses that Ibos are more 
successful entrepreneurs and the alternative hypothesis that economic 
opportunities were more attractive in the East. The Lag-s data provide a 
better test, since there the structure of opportunities (except for any form 
of discrimination) is identical; there we see that the coefficients of the 
Ibo variable are much smaller (except for growth) and net statistically 
significant. although they are still positive in all cases. The high 
coefficient for growth of employment requires explanation, since it is at 
variance with the rest of the findings. One plausible hypothesis is that in 
Lagos there. is particularly strong pressure for Ibo entrepreneurs to provide 
employment for relatives as an element of social (or family) obligation. 
Thus, increases in employment would reflect increasing levels of "transfer 
payments" to. relatives more than increase in the "real" size oi firm. But 
this. still reflects relatively high profits. 
Other variables which might be expected to influence psychological 
attitudes of entrepreneurs such as father's income, status,, or éducation 
were not significant in any of the régressions in which they were included. 
Certainly, the hypotheses that ethnicity or family background affect attitudes 
towards entrepreneurship cannot be r-ejected, but neither do these findings 
lend strong support to them. The confounding of ethnicity and opportunities 
must be considered and, furthermore, if the psychological effects are 
those of conditioning attitudes towards engaging or not engaging in entrep-
reneurial activity, one might expect little significant variation within 
a group of individuals, all of whom had engaged in such activity. 
The next group of variables (OEDD, AGE, SCLR) reflect various kinds of 
experience or skill which should affect the ability of an individual to perforr? 
successfully as au entrepreneur. The evidence with respect to these 
variables is ambiguous. 
Several forms of the éducation variable were tried since there is no 
obvious a priori spécification. Years of formai éducation, logarithmic 
and exponential functions of years of schooling, various orderings of 
levels of academic achievemcnt (none, some primary, primary completed, 
some secondary, secondary completed, post-secondary, etc.), and a dummy 
variable equal to one if the entrepreneur had completed six or more years 
of formai schooling were tried. The results were not sensitive to the 
spécification of this variable - the dummy variable form is used in the 
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reported régressions. The coefficients of the éducation variable, however, 
are rather puzzling. In the non-Lagos observations, they are statistically 
significant only in two cases in which the sign is negative and ail positive 
values are both small and not significant. There is a change of sign between 
natural number and logarithmiu spécifications of the size of firm variables 
(employment or assets), suggesting that a few very large firms in which the 
entrepreneur had less than six years of formai éducation give rise to the 
negative coefficient. 
What are we to make of this curious resuit? Dces it mean that resources 
devoted to éducation are being wasted in Nigeria? It is far from clear 
that there should be a very strong relationship between small-scale entrop-
reneurial performance and formai éducation. Undoubtedly literacy can be 
useful, but successful entrepreneurs are in a position to hire Clerks who 
can read and Interpret written material to them. Arithmetic ability is 
useful to an entrepreneur, but many illiterate traders seem able to carry 
fairly elaborate arrays of numbers in their heads. In fact, much of what 
passes as formai schooling may even be detrimental, since there is excessive 
emphasis on rote learning - creative ability tends to be squelched. I 
wouldn't want to push this argument too far since as businesses become of 
larger scale and of greater technical complexity, skill which are normally 
acquired through formai éducation will become important to entrepreneurs. 
I have argued elsewhere that two other factors are important in explaining 
this phenomenon. First, other kinds of éducation (apprenticeships, on-job 
- 2 a -
training, self-improvement courses carried out through correspondent. 
and learning by doing) are important substitutes for, and '^ technical 
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areas far superîor to, formai schooling. Secondly, a compensâtory 
mechanism is probably operative. Formai schooling is required for 
aavancement in the high-paying and secure civil service. Several of the 
most successful entrepreneurs stated that they were deterred from enterings 
or advancing in, the civil service because of their lack of formai qualifica-
tions, and they indicated a strong motivation to prove to ail that they 2<"i 
could succeed m spite of this handicap. It is also possible that m 
this sample, formai éducation and basic ability are inversely correlated. 
This would occur if, at higher levels of éducation, good students were 
offered permanent jobs, leaving only the bottom of the class to enter 
entrepreneurial careers while bright and energetic individuals, denied an 
opportunity for further schooling, turn to business as the best availablo 
alternative. 
Interesting différences appear between Lagos and the rest of the country 
with respect to the importance of -three other variables that reflect other 
kinds of occupational experience. There is evidence that large-scale 
entrepreneurs in other developing économies corne predominantly from trading 
backgrounds, while the earlier industrialists corne from backgrounds in 
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craft activities and tend to remain small-scale operators. In Nigeria 
previous employment in clérical or government jobs seem also to be impor-
tant sources of entrepreneurial talent, although the majority of industriel 
entrepreneurs corne from craft backgrounds. Coefficients of the dummy 
variables for trading or clérical and government experience (STED and 
SCLR) are positive; the coefficients for trading experience are higher 
and more often significant than those for clérical experience when the 
dépendent variable is number of employees - the relative magnitudes of 
the coefficients are reversed when the natural log of number of employees 
is substituted as the dépendent variable, suggesting that former traders 
control a sizeable number of the very largest firrns. But both backgrounds 22 account for larger than average firms. 
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In Lagos, former traders control smaller and less successful than 
average firms, while entrepreneurs with experience in clérical or govern-
ment work are well ahead of the rest. The obvicus explanation is that' 
the requirements for success are différent in Lagos (the Fédéral Capital) 
since government contracts and favors loom much more important. 
This is also borne out by observing similar différences in the 
coefficients of the dummy variable reflecting political involvement (FOL) 
which are-positive, large, and significant in Lagos, and negative or not 
significantly positive outside of Lagos. It also may well be that part of 
the effect attributable to clérical experience is actually accounted for 
by the éducation of such individuals, although the simple corrélation 
coefficient oetween the two variables is only .09= 
The other variable which should reflect experience is the âge at which 
the entrepreneur founded his business (AITB). It would appear reasonabln to 
expect that individuals starting businesses at later âges would have had 
more year-s of relevant experience in other activities, hence the sign of 
the coefficient should be positive. Most of these coefficients for the 
non-Lagos firms are positive, and some reach the .05 level of statistical 
significance, while in Lagos most of their. are negative. In either case, 
the absolute magnitudes are relatively. small, Again, it may be that in 
Lagos political connections are more important than specific experience or 
that the experience gained is not relevant to entrepreneurial success. 
The final three independent variables reflect ability to gain command 
over resources. Initial loans (ILN) reflect the ability of an entrepreneur 
to obtain crédit for establishing a firm, while the second variable (EXLN) 
reflects the ability to obtain crédit for expanding an existing firm. The 
third variable, political involvement (POL), has already been mentioned, 
but suffice it to say that in the Nigérian context prior to 1965 it seems 
plausible that capital, raw materials, or sales might be available on more 
23 favorable terms to an individual with political connections. 
Both in Lagos and elsewhere the coefficients of ILN are small, vary in 
sign, and are seldom statistically significant. Since capital markets are 
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highly imperfect and there are practically no large personal fortunes to 
be drawn upon in Nigeria, one would expect a considérable avantage to be 
obtained by individuals with aücess to credit which would enable them to 
start firms on a larger scale. In almost ail cases, even where credit was 
obtained, individuai savings were by far the m.ost important source of 
venture capital. There is widespread feeling among Nigérian entrepreneurs 
that the Virtual absence of credit institutions willing to lend to them 
présents a serious obstacle to industriai development. Yet these data 
suggest that individuals without access to credit have done as weil as 
(or even better than) others. This is quite consistent with observation 
I have made elsewhere stating that for industries of the kind represented 
in this sampj.e (simple technology and low investment thresholds), capital 
was probably not a serious obstacle since a firm coula start on a small scale 
L ^ J 
and grow through reinvested profits. However, the coefficients of the 
EXLN term suggest that availability of loans for expansion purposes has 
been extremely important. This may be partly misleading. Again, the 
prépondérant source of capital for expansion has come from reinvested profits. 
The rôle of loans may be to allow expansion at a more rapid pace than would 
otherwise be feasible (although the negative coefficient of this term in 
régression (5) and the small coefficient in régression (11) may cast doubt 
even on that). It is more likely that given the Nigérian institutional 
structure, the direction of causality is reversed. That is, firms which 
can demostrate their success are more likely to obtain loans from banks 
or equipment suppliers. Also, there is some tendency for loans to Substitute 
for reinvestment and many of the most successful (and accumulation mindeci) 
entrepreneurs professed an aversion to using credit. On the other hand, 
firms" in shaky condition (frequently with substantial excess capacity) arc 
the ones which most actively seek loans and complain ioudest about the 
lack of credit facilities. We can establish statistica! association but 
not causationî 
I have previously alluded to the possible misspecification of this model 
in the régressions reported. Table 3 présents the results of three alternative 
spécifications for the non-Lagos respondents. Equation (1) is the same one 
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Table 
Alternative Regression Spécifications - Non-Lagos Respondents 
Dependent 
Variable 
(13) 
PEMP 
(1) 
PEMP 
(14) 
PEMP 
Indep. 
Variable 
C 
IEMP 
RUBB 
IBO 
OEDD 
OED 
AGE . 
SCLR 
STRD 
ILN 
EXLN 
AITB 
POL 
INOV 
N 
R2 
F 
d.f. 
18.5097 
1.3380C 
-6.6446 
-.0454 
24.4353° 
30.6296° 
51.0237 
3.6061 
28.1704° 
101 
.5298 
12.9600 
8,92 
-26.3873 
1.2266C 
41.6476C 
18.9913C 
-19.5933* 
.3617 
9.9740 
21.2099C 
1.1026 
50.7555° 
2.7965* 
12.7545 
23.5940C 
101 
.5723 
9.8160 
12,188 
-23.1768 
1.2082C 
37.5077e 
20.9468e 
-17.90481 
>.2-839 
14.9467a 
26.52680 
4.4398 
51.9236 
2.8973b 
14.6460a 
101 
.5515 
9.9523 
11,89 
at >1.0 ; bt>1.3: Ct>1.6; t>2.0 
Notes to Table 3: Same as for Table 1, except that OED is own 
éducation, scaled 1 if none, 2 if some primary, 3 if primary 
completed, 4 is some secondary, 5 if secondary completed, 
6 if post-secondary éducation. 
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reported in Table 1, while Equations (13) and (14) are specified some-
what differently. In particular» Equation (14) regresses present employ-
ment on the same independent variables except innovation as (1). The 
degree of explanation is about the same in the two versions, althcugh 
an F test indicates that the addition of innovation is statistically 
significant. Comparing the two equations, it is apparent that the 
relative importance of the independent variables is not much changed. 
Almost all of the coefficients become larger, suggesting that most of 
them are also related to innovation, but that multicollinearity between 
innovation and any one of them is small (no simple correlation coefficienc 
exceeded 0.1). None of the previous interpretations is drastically 
affected. 
A compariscn between Equations íl) and (13) indicates that there is 
not a great deal tf choose bct>f»eii. "the explanatory pnwcrs of the two 
relaticoisiiipe, although (1) is slightly better. Variables which app^ar 
in both equations are of "the -same sign and approximste magnitude (with 
the exception of AGE whieh is not significant in either case). However, 
(1) is preferable because ¿t includes acditional variables which our 
theory suggests should be of some importance. Special conditions in the 
rubber processing industry (RUBB), receipt of loans for founding the 
business (ILN), the degree of dispersal of entrepreneurial effort <AITB), 
and the effect of Ibo ethnicity (IBO) are accounted for. Tb<= form of 
the education variable is different in the two equations but has negativa 
sign in both and the difference in magnitude merely reflects the 
different scaling of the variable (other regressions indicate little 
difference between the two formulations). Controlling for the specific 
conditions in the rubber industry and of Ibo ethnicity accounts for the 
lowering of the coefficients of clerical -and traaing occupational 
experience and of innovation. 
VI 
In this paper I have attempted to provide a framework for thinking 
about entrepreneurship and economic development in a more systematic 
manner than has been common. In particular, the theoretical apparatus 
H.. 
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provides an explicit way cf considerine "tho in-ter-play be-twocn psychological} 
social, and economic variables and avoids resorting to a single-factor 
explanation. In addition non-homogeneity of projects anc imperfect 
information are accommodaied• While few, if any, of the implications 
of this model will come surprise anyone who has thought about the problem 
in more conventional economic terms, these results can only be obtained 
from the usuai theory of the firm by making many intuitatively plausible 
but ad hoc and non-rigorous modifications. 
Also an attempt has been made to test some implications of the model 
with Nigérian data by use of ordinary least squares régression analysis. 
2 While none of the R 's are particularly high (ranging from .13 to .57), i 
they do represent statistically significant degrees of explanation. Given 
the necessarily crude measures of entrepreneurial performance and of the 
various socio-economic independent variables, these results are rather 
encouraging. 
Indeed, in such cross section data one would hardly expect a high 
degree of explanation. I_3b_l Much of the literature on entrepreneurship 
has emphasized the importance of psychological variables which shape the 
attitude of individuals towards undertaking entrepreneurial activity. We 
could hope to capture these effects only insomuch as they were systematically 
influenced by ethnicity or father's position in society - ethnicity is 
confcunded with regional variassions in the structure cf opportunities, and 
the various measures of father's position are never statistically significant. 
Furthermore, it may well be that the appropriate comparison is between 
entrepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial groups, while our data "allow 
comparison only between entrepreneurs varying in degree of success. 
Certainly entrepreneurial performance depends on individuai différences 
that cannot possibly be accounted for in toto by a few imperfectly measured 
socio-econcmic variables. 
However, willingness to engage in entrepreneurial activity is not 
enough - there must also be an ability to respond. to opportunities and 
this is influenced by specific kinds of experience and institutions which 
enable individuals to gain ccmmand over resources. This analysis is 
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somewhat more successful in illuminaiing such factors. 
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Appendix I 
The tables in this appendix show the composition of the sample cf 
firms included in the analysis of Sec'tiois III and IV. 
Table 1.1 
Distribution of Firms Interviewed 
Industry No. Interviewed No. Interviewed Total 
by Harris by Rowe 
Sawmilling 36 29 65 
Furniture 16 18 34 
Rubber Processing 10 0 10 
Printing 16 32 48 
Garment Making 6 24 30 
Ali other industries 17 65 82 
Totals 101 168 269 
Table 1.2 
Distribution by Number of Employees of Firms Interviewed 
Number of No. Interviewed No. Interviewed Total 
Employees ' by Harris by Rowe 
10 or less 5 31 36 
11-15 11 39 '50 
16-20 12 25 37 
21-25 10 12 22 
26-30 11 13 24 
31-40 10 15 25 
41-50 9 4 13 
51-75 . 8 10 18 
76-100 11 8 19 
101-200 7 4 U 
201-300 6 3 9 
301-500 1 0 1 
more than 500 0 1 1 . 
Totals 101 165* 
* Data were not available from three firms. 
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Table 1.3 
Distribution by Value of Assets of Firms Interviewed 
Value of Assets 
(£ Nigeria) 
Less than £100 
£1001-5000 
£5001-10,000 
£10,001-20,000 
£20,001-50,000 
£50,001-100,000 
more than £100,000 
No. Interviewed 
by Harris 
3 
17 
24 
18 
25 
7 . 
7 
No. Interviewed Total 
by Rowe 
16 19 
69 86 
26 50 
23 41 
20 45 
5 12 
5 12 
Totals 101 164* 265* 
*Data were not available from four firms. 
Table 1.4 
Distribution by Type of Organization of Firms Interviewed 
Type of 
Organization 
Proprietorship 
Partnership 
Private Limited Company 
Public Mmited Company 
No. Interviewed 
by Harris 
41 
14 
42 
4 
No. Interviewed Total 
by Rowe 
95 135 
43 57 
30 72 
0 4 
Totals 101 168 269 
Table 1.5 
Regional Distribution of Firms Interviewed 
Region Number of Firms 
L agos metropolitan* 168 
West** 35 
Mid-West 16 
East 39 
North 11 
Total 269 
*includes some parts of the Western région 
**not including those parts in the Lagos metropolitan area 
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Table 1.6 
Distribution of Entrepreneurs Interviewed Aecording 
to Ethnie Group (Tribe) 
ETHNIC GROUP NUMBER 
Yoruba 172 
Ibo 58 
Edo 24 
Ibibio, Efoks and Ijaw 5 
Kausa 7 
Other 3 
TOTAL 269 
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FOOTNOTES 
* This research has been supported at various points by the SSRC/ACLS 
Foreign Area Fellowship Program, The Northwestern University Council for 
Intersocietal Research, the Nigerian Institute of Social and Econom.ic 
Research, The Alfred P. Sloan School of Management Computation Facility 
at M.I.T., and the Rockefeller Foundation. 
I have benefited greatly from the comments and suggestions on earlier 
drafts by George Dalton, Matthew Eddl, Everett Hagen, J.R.T. Hughes, David 
Miller, Frank Mitchell, and Harold Williamson Sr. Jerome Rothenberg 
suggested the particular theoretical approach for which I am extremely 
grateful and Mary Rowe collaborated in collection of data in Nigeria. 
However, remaining errors are mv solé responsibility. 
Parts III-V are based heavily on an earlier paper /Z5J and Part I 
is based on part cf Chapter II of my dissertation /XH/. 
1. The literature is extensive, but th_e_main lines of approach can be 
found in Schumpeter [HS7, Knight Ißol, and Cole ¡i57. Other important 
works include ¿16/, ¿19/, ¿20/, ¿31/, ¿33/, and/43/. 
2. See _the typologies proposed by Danhof quoted by Brosen ¿QJ, Cole [/¿]f 
' ".: ' Hughes ¡2. 8/ s and Alexander ¿ZJ. 
3. This définition follows closely that of Harbison's "organisation" /x.3/ 
or Hirschmqn's "ability to maks development decisions" [Zl_/. 
4. Greenhut ¿ 7. \_J argues that profits are a functional. not a residual, 
return to entrepreneurship. However, he attributes all differential 
returns to decisión makers as reflecting differential skills. To a 
large extent this is true, but he seems to go too far. 
5. If a single authority or decision-making unit undertakes ali invest-
ment in the_economy, there is no problem. In that case, outimed by 
Chenery /_/5/, "The related décision rule is to rank projects by their 
SMP _/Social Marginal Product/ and go down the list until the funds to 
be allocated are exhaustod. Alternatively, any project having an 
SMP above a given level can be approved." 
6. I am indebted to Jerome Rothenberg for suggesting this approach. 
7. Note that projects which involve producing a given output at lower 
cost than existing methods will release factors of production. It 
is tacitly assumed that these factors will find alternative employrnent. 
In an economy with unemployment, adoption of such as project could 
lead to lower output through income effects. AY-, is defined as the 
incrementai output associated with the exploitation of the jth project. 
There is ne reason why AYj cannot be negative. 
Also not that only new projects (including expansion of existing 
production units) are being considered in this model. Thus the sum 
of the AY-j s is the change in output arising from the exploitation of 
new project. 
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8. This approach is similar to that employed by Lancaster I3LI in describ-
ing the choice set of a consumer. 
S. This•• follows recent works on the managerial firm, e.g. Harris /37] and 
Williamson /V^/, which postulate a.utility function for the firm. 
10a. This notation and argument follows Pearce ¿jLl. 
lDb. "For one, the actor /entrepreneur/ does not really know all the alter-
natives: he must find them out, and for this purpose, a period of search 
is necessary. Secondly, the actor does not know all the consequences, 
and has neither the time_nor the skill to figure them out." P. Lazarsfield; 
quoted by McClelland ¡5$/ p. 237. 
11. Two papers by Campbell, ///_/ JJZj, provide particularly interesting 
treatments of perception in a cross-cultural context. 
The need for identifying individual's subjective probabilities is 
mentioned by Arrow [3J• However, this is necessary only if we are con-
cerned with the choice itself, distinct from the consequences of the 
choice for the economy according to Georgescu-Roegen [/QJ. By concentrat-
ing on the probability of a project being exploited within the economy 
rather than on the probability of a particular decision unit's exploiting 
a project, our neglect of the perception problem is justified. 
12. See IVOJ 
13. See ¿17 
14. See Ñ F J 
15. The principal problem encountered was an absence of information concerning 
the universe of indigenously woned manufacturing establishments. Although 
an industrial directory had been prepared for the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, it was incompleto, inaccurate, and nationality of ownership 
of firms was not indicated. Henee, it seemed reasonable to concéntrate 
on specific industries which were known to have a high degree of Nigerian 
participation, wide geographical distribution, and a range of firm sizes. 
One could easily gain information about the existence of competitiva firms 
from respondents, thereby giving quite accurato coverage of those industriar; 
15. Footwear and baking were the only major industries oniitted which satisfied 
the above criteria for inclusión. These were_deliberately excluded_because 
comprehensive indnstry studies, P. Kilby, ¡jfjj and E.W. Nafziger, J3V had 
been recently undertaken and their results were available. 
17. The relevant ethnological literatura is_reviewed and hypotheses regarding 
n-achievement levels tested by Le^ine /3j//. 
18. See Table 3 for an alternativo specification of the education variable. 
19. Harris, /^VA Chaptor IX. See also_A. Callaway, !J/_], ¿/Oj, discussions cf 
non-formal education. S Bowles ¡JTJ presents estimates of returns to 
education in Northern Nigeria which are positive and quite high. 
20. See T. Geiger and W. Armstrong, //7/» Chapter II and Appendix I. 
21. See A. Alexander, for a good review of this literature , 
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Two rather different spécifications are plausible. One is to keep 
'the entire set of dummy variables relating to a single conceptual 
variable (e.g. prior occupation) and to test the significance .of the 
entire set by means of an F test, not paying attention to the 
significance of any single dummy variable alone. However problems of 
artificial multicollinearity arise from including large numbers of dummy 
variables in régression. C. Lin, suggested an alternative approach 
which would compress the dummy variables into a single vector for each 
effect, allowing estimation of both a constant and compie*- sets of 
effects for each underlying variable. Unfortunately, problems arose 
with the procedure and it had to be abandoned. The alternative specific 
tion adopted in the régressions reported in this paper is only to includ 
those particular dummy variables Which are "important'' in the sense that 
they are dignificantly dissimilar to the other dummy variables in the 
group (e.g. rubber processing is quite different from ali of the other 
industries which show less variation aroong themselves). 
See Henry Bretton, /6/ and /]_/, 81, 82. 
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